

TO : ICLC  
FROM : S. Bardwell  
RE : Third Rome Hypothesis  
DATE : January 13, 1984

The central factual question underlying the original Third Rome Hypothesis is that of whether a "phase change" in Soviet policy occurred with the Soviet rejection of the March 23 Reagan offer.\* Only after examination of the evidence surrounding this Soviet reaction, can the more general, methodological question of the Soviet "national soul" be considered. The analysis of this methodological question leads, in turn, to consideration of the lessons for the organization of the acceptance of the Third Rome policy.

#### SOVIET REACTION TO MARCH 23 CONTRADICTS THIRD ROME HYPOTHESIS

Let us begin with a precise specification of what President Reagan's March 23 speech said and did not say. Reagan's speech did not make (or propose) any near-term change in either policy or deployment of the world's strategic arsenal; Reagan explicitly noted that only in the next century would the effect of strategic defense be felt. Reagan's speech did not make (or propose) any near-term

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\* As Lyn said, in reference to the Hypothesis in an internal memo of August 30:

The crucial issue is...whether or not Moscow knew the implications of rejecting my policy without (until this week) even offering to consider exploratory negotiations. What does this behavior say of the Soviet leadership today? They willfully chose thermonuclear confrontation, willfully risked thermonuclear war. That action, on so important a matter, is key to the political character of that leadership. Once that fact is settled, the issue of the 'Third Rome' is easily resolved on the basis of simple facts in hand.

The issue whether the 'Third Rome' current is an integral part of the Soviet cultural matrix is no issue at all, except to fools who know nothing of the history of Russia and of the 1905 and 1917 revolutions, or Soviet history since. The only issue is whether that cultural matrix has or has not taken over the Soviet leadership. The Soviet leadership's response on crucial decisions affecting the very existence of civilization itself is the only measure by which such a question can be decisively tested one way or the other. If the Soviet leadership knew the implications of reflecting the peace offer made on and immediately after March 23, 1983, then, by remorseless logic, the proof that the 'Third Rome' rules Moscow--at least, temporarily-- is conclusive. That was the only serious question raised on the discussions so far. The rest is mere pesiflage, better forgotten sooner than it is uttered.

change in American deployment of offensive nuclear weapons; Reagan explicitly called for a continuation of deterrence as the basis of American strategy. Reagan's speech did not call for any large budgetary increases let alone a crash program; in his speech and the press interview on March 29, Reagan explicitly rejected the idea of a crash program and denied that his program would result in even a doubling of the present R&D budget. Reagan's speech did not make any change in the treaties controlling defensive weapons; Reagan used his speech to defend arms control as the primary aim of U.S. military policy.

The lack of any action inconsistent with the original speech from the Reagan Administration in the 10 months since the speech is quite striking. The Reagan Administration has not made public announcements, budgetary changes, or strategic reevaluations in any sense different than the original speech.

However, Reagan's speech did discuss a new technological developments which "in the next century" would fundamentally change strategic doctrine, deployments, and the role and nature of defensive weapons. The speech, coupled with statements in the following period by Secretary of Defense Weinberger, did make the offer of consultation with the Soviet Union on the development of defensive systems. And, the speech did pose the problem of beam weapon development in the context of a moving appeal to the sanity of the human race in the face of the continued threat of Mutually Assured Destruction.

This was obviously a very important initiative. It was certainly important enough to provoke every oligarchical asset to attempt to neutralize the Reagan Administration. But no amount of wishful thinking or speculation about factional divisions in the Administration can change what the initiative actually sets out. Most specifically, Reagan's March 23 speech is only the palest reflection of our beam weapon policy: it lacks any sense of urgency; it does not understand the economic and technological impact of beam weapons' development; and, it does not address the more general doctrinal problem of the Pugwash-oligarchical conspiracy underneath all Western weapons policy of the last three decades.

Unfortunately, the Soviet Union reacted to the Reagan initiative with a combination of fear, typical lying, and timid feelers in the direction of sounding out the sincerity of the offer. But they did not "reject" Reagan's offer. That is a simple matter of fact. As is described in detail below, the Soviets responded diplomatically on the highest level (including Andropov) with an offer to discuss the proposal, and followed through on that proposal at the Erice meeting. This response was real.

It is ironic and very revealing that the reaction of most military professionals in the Pentagon closely resembled the Soviet response; the reaction of high officials in the Pentagon was, and continues to be, almost identical to that of the Soviets: a mixture of fear of destabilizing the present situation (even among those who regard the present situation as dangerous for the U.S.), ludicrous

claims of the impossibility (or expense) of strategic defense, and bureaucratic conservatism. I have personally had conversations with several leading Air Force strategists, for example, who made all three of these points in their attacks on beam weapons. But, it is essentially and fundamentally wrong to say that the Soviet's rejected the Reagan offer and then began a drive towards a nuclear showdown with the U.S. set for the early part of 1984.

### Soviet War-Fighting Doctrine as the "Matrix" of Soviet Policy

Before examining the Soviet reaction to Reagan's speech, some consideration of the historical background to the question is necessary. The Soviet's fear of the Reagan proposal is intimately tied to their military doctrine of nuclear war-fighting. It should be obvious that the Soviet war-fighting doctrine itself is neither imperial nor derivative from a Third Rome policy matrix. As Lyn said in his "Open Letter to Indira Gandhi":

My starting-point of reference, for designing an overthrow of this evil folly of Nuclear Deterrence, was the Soviet 'Military Strategy' of Marshal V.D. Sokolovskii, which continues to be one of the soundest studies of thermonuclear warfare from the standpoint of the modern classical military-science tradition of Carnot and Scharnhorst.

Two elements of this doctrine stand out:

1) The necessity of as large as possible offensive nuclear arsenal, deployed preemptively. This idea is central to all Soviet discussions of the question for the past 20 years. The "current" Soviet build-up is not recent in either intention or fact -- it has been an invariant for the past two decades.

2) The necessity for occupation of enemy territory by infantry. This requires all the arsenal over which our own publications have been so hysterical of late: massive armor capabilities, mobile air defense, and special forces of all types.

Any serious war-winning capability in the era of offense-dominated war must be configured roughly as the Soviets have done. This obvious fact is the reason that the organization has proposed an arms build-up for the U.S. that parallels almost exactly the Soviet order of battle. (Note, as I discuss below, such a policy would at this point in time decrease the security of the United States, since we are leaving the era of offense-dominated warfare and entering the era of defense-dominated warfare -- new technologies and strategies are required for real national security. I discuss below the distinction between the old, offense-dominated strategies of assured vulnerability (in the West) and preemptive nuclear war-fighting (in the East Bloc) and the new, defense-dominated strategy of mutually assured survival.)

## Soviet Analysis of the Limits of Their Doctrine

Most importantly for an analysis of their reaction to the March 23 Reagan speech, however, is the fact that in parallel with their largely successful attempts to formulate a theory and order of battle for strategic nuclear war, Soviet military strategists have engaged in a theoretical effort to define the limits of that order of battle. There exists in the Soviet Union a large body of military writings dealing with the question of the role of science and technology in determining the nature of the next war. Since the very earliest period of the Sokolovskii doctrine, these theoreticians have been extremely worried about the possibility that a new technological development might come about, a development which might occur in the West before the Soviet Union, or, equally disastrous from their point of view, be of such a nature that the West could use its much larger, more flexible economic resources to deploy such a breakthrough before the Soviet Union.

In response to this problem, Soviet military strategists have looked with equal emphasis at the questions of, on the one hand, winning a World War 3 fought with long-range, offensive nuclear rockets, and, on the other, of not losing a new kind of war. According to these Soviet strategists, there are two critical prerequisites on whose continued existence depends the success of the Soviet doctrine of offense-dominated warfare (and whose overthrow would invalidate the Soviet doctrine): first, the existence of Soviet offensive capabilities roughly equivalent to those of the U.S., and secondly, the nonexistence of a strategic defense.

The first of these conditions specifies, in the minds of the Soviet military planners, that the Soviet Union must build offensive nuclear weapons as rapidly and as widely as possible. The calculations based on a war-fighting strategy show clearly that more is better, and that a "build-up" -- without the connotation that it has a numerical goal after which it will stop -- will be balanced only by the calculation that a new Soviet deployment must not result in a U.S. response which the Soviets cannot match. It obviously does not imply that the Soviets will stop their build-up at the point that they feel "safe," or have achieved "parity." The continuing Soviet development of new offensive arms, alongside their maintenance of stocks of old weapons, is the necessary outcome of any rigorously pursued nuclear war-fighting strategy (at least, one in an offense-dominated technological context).

The second of these conditions rests on a very important and easily misunderstood distinction between strategic (or area) and tactical (or local) defense against nuclear weapons. Only with a space-based, boost-phase intercept capability does the nuclear-tipped ballistic missile become obsolete. Point defense, while important, still concedes unchallenged superiority to offensive nuclear bombardment, and leaves to defense only the

capability of damage limitation; the more critical task of "offense denial" is largely untouched. This point is critical: point defense (either passive defense like civil defense or industrial hardening, as well as active point defense using anti-missile missiles, air defense, etc.) provides only the ability to decrease the damage that a given target will suffer. It does not affect the ability of one's adversary to inflict tremendous damage on the target of his choosing. It can limit the extent of damage (and, more importantly, ease the problems of recovery), but it cannot deny one's adversary his offensive capabilities.

But, the discovery of the x-ray laser in a space-based mode (and the subsequent variations of this idea generically called third-generation nuclear weapons), has totally revolutionized the problem of "offense-denial." Soviet military thinkers must have been as surprised with the idea as was the greatest military-scientific thinker in the classical school in the U.S. military, and certainly no amateur in military technology, Edward Teller.

Only space-based, boost-phase intercept of nuclear missiles makes mutually assured survival possible. There exists no mention (to my knowledge or any one I have talked to) in the Soviet literature of the past two decades, nor any evidence that I know of (or have found) that the Soviets seriously considered the possibility of effective area defense against nuclear weapons (until the most recent period of course).\* All the data we have

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\* Interested readers can obtain from me a list of sources, both military and scientific, on Soviet BMD. Very informative discussions of both the order of Soviet defense as well as Soviet defensive strategy are contained in the following articles written from totally differing political positions:

S. Graybeal and D. Goure, "Soviet Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Objectives: Past, Present and Future," in Ballistic Missile Defense Advanced Technology Center, U.S. Arms Control Objectives and the Implications for Ballistic Missile Defense (Puritan Press, 1980).

S. Stevens, "The Soviet BMD Program," in A. B. Carter and D. N. Schwartz, Ballistic Missile Defense (The Brookings Institution, 1984).

R. Garthoff, "BMD and East-West Relations," in A. B. Carter and D. N. Schwartz, Ballistic Missile Defense (The Brookings Institution, 1984).

The most recent data on this subject (see for example, Stevens above, and Clarence Robinson's article in Aviation Week and Space Technology, January 16, 1984) indicate that in the past year or two, the Soviets have begun research on space-based, boost-phase intercept technologies. The status of their program for strategic defense is classified (if known at all), but it is important to distinguish this program from the very advanced and important point defense (against reentry vehicles) that the Soviets are in the process of up-grading now and which was the subject of the recent CIA report.

on Soviet work in the area of defense against nuclear weapons is either of the nature of passive defense (civil defense, etc.) or point defense. We have no evidence of Soviet work on space-based, boost-phase intercept of ballistic missiles before the last year. This fact, while negative (that is, lack of evidence does not prove that the evidence does not exist), is corroborated by the extensive doctrinal and theoretical literature from Soviet military thinkers. I know of no instance where they give any indication of Soviet military interest in the realistic possibility of boost-phase intercept.

The importance in Soviet thinking of these questions is well summarized in an early article (published in 1969), whose ideas have been reiterated many times since, from Maj. Gen. V.I. Zenskov from an article in the secret Soviet military publication, Military Thought, called "Wars of the Modern Era" (I can supply interested readers with literally scores of citations of the same sort.):

The degree of probability of a particular type of war does not, of course, remain the same for each historical period, and changes under the influence of a number of political and military-technical factors. Of special importance in this connection can be the disruption of the "nuclear balance." It is possible, for example, in case of further sharp increase of nuclear potential or the creation by one of the sides of highly effective means of anti-ballistic missile defense while the other side lags considerably in solution of these tasks. A change in the "nuclear balance" in favor of the countries of imperialism would increase many-fold the danger of a nuclear war.

The Soviet reaction to Reagan's speech can only be understood against the background of 20 years of Soviet fear of an American technological breakout in the area of strategic defense. From this historical perspective, the Soviet response is entirely logical -- certainly not rational, statesman-like, or far-sighted, and just as certainly dangerous -- but by no stretch of the imagination, a "phase change" in Soviet policy. The amount of Soviet propaganda generated in response to the Reagan speech, much of it literally in the week following the speech (in quantities that several Soviet watchers characterized as unprecedented in their experience) is understandable only on the basis of the historical background described above.

In any case, the existence of the Soviet hysteria around the speech does not demand a new hypothesis for its explanation, and in no way constitutes a "critical experiment" for the nature of Soviet intentions. One need only look at the Soviet military literature over the past 20 years to see that this "technological breakout" has been the greatest fear of Soviet planners.

## Did the Soviets Reject the Reagan Offer?

However, the actual diplomatic response by the Soviet Union definitively disproves the idea that Moscow was controlled by a "Third Rome" imperial faction. The facts of the Soviet diplomatic replies to the Reagan proposal cannot be squared with the idea of a profound paradigm shift in the Soviet Union towards the Third and Final Rome policy outlook. The simple fact is that the Soviet Union did respond to the Reagan offer; they did not reject it out of hand.

On at least two occasions, Soviet officials on the highest levels reiterated the Soviet "position": the Soviet Union rejects all weapons in space (untrue, but typical); the Soviet Union has proposed many treaties banning these weapons and will continue to do so (true, but disingenuous given Soviet research on anti-satellite weapons); but, the Soviet Union proposes that the scientists of both countries get together to discuss strategic defence. On April 25, Andropov himself used this formulation:

The United States has embarked on the road of unleashing an unprecedented arms race in all directions and is spiraling international tension to the limit.

I refer, in particular, also to Washington's announced plans of developing a large-scale and highly effective anti-ballistic missile defense. The adventurism and danger of this whole idea is that the emphasis in it is made on impunity, on developing the first nuclear strike, thinking that they can protect themselves from the reply strike. From here it is not far to the temptation to reach out for the firing button. This is the main danger of the new American military concept. It is capable only of bringing the world closer to the nuclear precipice. It comes out that while they are speaking of defense, in reality they are planting a mine under the entire process of limiting strategic arms.

Authoritative scientists of the world are saying that this is exactly the case. We propose to the United States Government: Let Soviet and American specialists in this field, meet and discuss the possible consequences of creating a large-scale anti-ballistic defense system. Let science say its mighty word.

This response was not merely rhetorical or propagandistic, as evidenced by the Soviet participation with their leading scientists at the Erice meeting. It is worth quoting the final communique of that meeting to get a more accurate sense of the actual Soviet response to the President's proposal:

Another important point [the first being the study of the global effects of nuclear war] emerged during this third session and is the problem of defensive weapons. The underlying philosophy of this new point lies in the problem of studying

- 1) Is it possible to identify the characteristics and properties which a weapon would have in order to be effectively considered defensive in nature, i.e., the opposite of offensive?
- 2) Is it true that an advanced system of defense could produce destabilizing effects? And, if that is so, why and how?
- 3) Why not study new methods of getting out of this balance of terror?

It is therefore proposed to form a joint Europe-U.S.-USSR research group, based at the Ettore Majorana center, for collaborative study of the two-above mentioned points, namely:

- 1) The simulation and evaluation of the global consequences of a U.S.-USSR nuclear conflict.
- 2) A way out of the present balance of terror; and, in particular if it is possible to conceive of a new type of defense system against nuclear destruction.

There is no reasonable interpretation of these events as a "rejection." Furthermore, since a true Third Rome orientation would have resulted in total rejection of the proposal, the Soviet reaction is strong evidence for continued control of the Soviet Union by a military faction.

However, there are two further points which must be examined in this regard. First, why did the Soviets not wholeheartedly embrace the initiative, and secondly, what has happened since the Eliche meeting to these initial steps?

#### Soviets Responded to Reagan's Ambiguous Policy

The timidity and reservations surrounding the Soviet reaction to the March 23 proposal must be judged in the larger policy context of the Reagan Administration's relations to the Soviet Union. In assessing this policy context (and the Soviet perception of it), it is very dangerous to color judgements of the Reagan Administration on the basis of our assessment of internal faction fights, wishful thinking, or subtle discriminations of intention. When Reagan makes an address to a fundamentalist convention on March 8 (two weeks before the March 23 speech) calling the Soviet Union the "focus of evil in the world...another sad, bizarre chapter in human history whose last pages even now are being written," any logical military thinker would be foolish not to examine every "offer" from Reagan very careful.

The Reagan Administration's actions in favor of the beam weapon policy have been at best luke-warm. The following are the most salient features of these actions:

- 1) In spite of the verbal commitment to a new strategic policy, the Administration has done nothing more than make speeches. There has been no new policy actually formulated (an actual military plan for offense-denial, defensive strategy); there has been absolutely no change in the structure or deployment of U.S. forces; and there has been a minimal (if any) change in R&D policy in the direction of defense strategy.

The most critical area of this lack of change in on the question of the deployment of the next generation of offensive weapons, specifically the Pershing 2 and MX missiles.\* From the Soviet side, the question is: How serious is Mr. Reagan about his commitment to defense weapons, and what should the Soviets do in response to it?

The most basic answer to that question will be provided by a look at what the U.S. is doing militarily in response to the President's offer. At the present time, the Administration has accelerated its commitment to an offense-dominated policy; it has increased the offense-dominance of the U.S. forces by deploying a generation of missiles with nothing but first-strike use. From a military point the issue is absolutely clear: a country either continues an offense-dominated strategy or begins the massive changes in both doctrine and force structure required for defense-dominated war-fighting. The two could not be more different.

Offense-dominated strategy requires massive (in principle, unlimited amounts) of offensive ballistic missile-launched thermonuclear weaponry. It requires a first- or preemptive-strike orientation with launch-on-warning as a "backup" capability. It puts a tremendous premium on the ability to deliver this destructive capability in as short a time as possible (the goal being to make launch on warning by the other side impossible) and to deliver it as accurately as possible (so as to destroy the other side's offensive capabilities "in the silo"). In this offense-dominated setting, defense can only be used to limit the damage sure to be inflicted by the other side (destroying, say, 40% of the incoming warheads, protecting 80% of the population, etc.).

Defensive-dominated warfare (as Teller has perceptively pointed out) is based on defensive nuclear weapons, either first-generation beam weapons (based on so-called third-generation nuclear weapons) or on the more sophisticated successors to these crude microwave,

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\* I prepared a long memo in June on the military implications and policy significance of the organization's support for deployment of the Pershing missiles, which is available to interested members. It was circulated to Lyn and the NEC before the July conference. On the significance of these weapons in Europe, I quote Lyn from his "Open Letter to Indira Gandhi":

The Soviet deployment of a new series of intermediate and short-range thermonuclear missile-systems, beginning with the SS-20, and the NATO response prompted by Henry A. Kissinger in 1979, the so-called forward positioning of a new generation of 'Euromissiles,' represented a stage of implementation of Dr. Leo Szilard's Pugwash Conference doctrine which brought the superpowers to the verge of 'launch on warning,' a condition in which computer-systems, not military commanders, unleash and control in-depth thermonuclear barrages between the powers.

enhanced radiation, and x-ray devices in the form of x-ray lasers. Teller insists that the dominance of the defense will result in more than 95% of our nuclear weapons being used for destruction of missiles in flight. There is no premium on being able to deliver offensive destructive power in a short-time (although accuracy remains an advantage). This is not to say, of course, that long-range, strategic weapons like the MX will cease to exist, but short-range weapons like the Pershing will be avoided because they decrease the security of the country deploying them.\*

It is this strategic orientation that determines the military significance of these weapons: they give the U.S. a very accurate, short delivery-time, weapon against major silo and command/control centers in the Soviet Union. There is no comparable Soviet weapon because there are no land-based, short-range Soviet missiles which can hit the United States. Note that the deployment of Soviet submarines is a weak response to the Pershing missiles, because the submarine launched ballistic missile is not accurate enough to destroy hardened targets.

2) The assessment of Reagan Administration policy on the part of the Soviets is also conditioned by their perception of the Administration's assessment of Soviet intentions. Reagan address to the fundamentalist convention on March 8 has been followed by a series of similar pronouncements. This problem is now being recognized by the Reagan Administration itself; Reagan has advertised his major policy speech on relations with the Soviets explicitly on the necessity of clearing the air of this sort of statement (Reagan's desire to "reassure" the Soviets has been explicitly stated by Sen. Laxalt as the reason for the speech).

3) The actions by the Administration in the area of scientific, technical, and commercial relations in which context the sincerity of Reagan's offer of joint work on defensive weapons would occur, have been extremely hostile. Specifically in the area of any technology with potential military application, the Reagan Administration has been bizarre. The most remarkable of these is the (successful) effort of the Administration to prevent the export to the Soviet Union of a DEC-1134 computer. This commercial minicomputer, available in the U.S. for more than a decade, was the subject of major "sting" in the operations to stop export of "advanced technologies" to the Soviet Union. When computers much more sophisticated than that are offered to the Chinese, any Soviet military commander would be a fool not to have second thoughts about the offer to share the most advanced military technologies required for beam weapons (not only computer technologies, but guidance, optics, lasers, and power sources).

Reagan's initial statement in regard to sharing the defensive technologies (which Weinberger took up later) must have given the Soviet military strategists considerable puzzlement (from his press interview of March 29):

In my opinion, if a defensive weapon could be found and developed that would reduce the utility of these or maybe even make them obsolete, then whenever that time came, a President of the United States would be able to say, "Now, we have both the deterrent, the missiles -- as we have had in the past, but now this other thing that has altered this --" And he could follow any one of a number of courses [emphasis mine]. He could offer to give that same defensive weapon to them to prove to them that there was no longer any need for keeping these missiles. Or with that defense, he could then say to them, "I am willing to do away with all my missiles. You do away with all of yours."

The most recent speeches of both Reagan and Weinberger continue to pose the "generous American offer" in this double-edged way: we may share our defensive weapons or we may use them to enforce an ultimatum on disarmament. This is a real factional question in the Administration, given the intense opposition that Teller has received to his proposal for unilateral disclosure of scientific information with the Soviets. The Soviets would have to be fools to take Reagan's offer as naively as the organization has.

### The Soviet Military Psychology

None of these policies of the Reagan Administration justify the Soviet position, but to imagine that a Soviet military commander would not consider these facts more seriously than our imputation of motive to Reagan, is the height of self-delusion. As I summarized in my memo to the conference, the Soviet military psychology operates along the fairly obvious line that if the Reagan policy means continuation of offense-dominated strategy (as it does), then the Soviets will respond in kind. Their thinking proceeds as follows (a process not so different from a typical U.S. military commander):

Your adversary, long committed to your military destruction, with an economy and technological base which has repeatedly outstripped you with one hand tied behind its back, proposes a totally new world military order. The basis of this is a technology which took you, as a Soviet general, by surprise -- the space-based x-ray laser. (Note well here that you, as a Soviet planner have not, until recently, researched, let alone considered deploying, a space-based, boost-phase intercept capability.)

Your adversary, while recommending this new defensive strategy, continues with his plans for deployment of a new offensive weapon (the Pershing 2) which is completely asymmetrical (it can reach the Soviet Union's strategic arsenal -- the SS-20s cannot reach the American strategic arsenal). As its original proponents were honest enough to state, this weapon has no retaliatory significance; given its time of flight and accuracy, it is a first- or preemptive-strike weapon.

Your adversary, while on the one hand recommending joint deployment of these new defensive weapons, gives a major policy statement identifying the Soviet Union as an "evil empire" and breaks off almost all significant scientific, cultural and economic contacts (it must be hard to believe that your adversary, who refuses to sell you a 15 year old commercial minicomputer, will share space-based x-ray laser technologies). In answer to the several responses to the March 23 speech from, among others, Andropov himself, proposing meetings of the scientists of both countries to discuss the idea, the State Department of your adversary replies that they are interested only in "state to state" discussions. The tentative steps taken informally in that direction (at the Erice meeting) are totally destroyed by the KAL incident.

Your reaction, as a Soviet general, is predictable: since 1965 major policy statements have appeared regularly in Soviet military journals emphasizing the tremendous fear of "technological breakout" by your adversary. The current speeches attacking beam weapons are cut from this mold, a constant theme of the last 20 years. Even a casual reading of the Soviet military literature will show Ustinov's infamous 1981 mobilization speech repeated regularly every year on Armed Forces Day by one general or another.

Worst of all, your reaction is conditioned by the fact that your own defensive weapons strategy has been totally based on point-defense, and the offer from your adversary to share his area-defense technologies would put you, as a military man, in the very uncomfortable position of depending on the intentions of your adversary for your defense.

In the situation that the U.S. has a space-based beam weapon, and you as a Soviet general do not, the Soviet preemptive strike strategy (an order of battle in which you are able to disarm your adversary with "acceptable" losses -- a rational one in the context of complete dominance of offensive weapons) is replaced by your adversary's first strike capability (an order of battle in which you are disarmed with negligible losses to your adversary). As a good Clausewitzian, you can see that only a space-based, boost phase intercept makes a first strike possible, and that only mutual deployment insures mutual defense rather than your forced disarmament. The deployment of the Pershings makes this inference almost unavoidable.

In the context of an accelerating build-up of first-strike, offensive weapons (like the Pershing 2 and MX), in the context of massive increases in the U.S. defense budget (which the Soviets must see as clearly as we did until this year, were "in width" and not "in depth"), in this context, how is this bureaucratic, defensive, and slightly paranoid Soviet general to judge President Reagan's offer?

## What Really Happened in the KAL Incident?

The climate of potential dialogue established at the Eric meeting has been (until the events of the past week) totally dead. The causes of this are obvious to all: the KAL incident which chilled U.S.-Soviet relations more seriously than any event since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The KAL incident figured very largely as well in the organization's assessment of the Soviet Union and bears a more careful examination. In the three months following the incident the following facts have become irrefutably clear, and demand a new evaluation on our part of the significance of the event

1) The Soviets did not "reprogram" the plane's flight. It is inconceivable that the Soviet Union was involved in reprogramming the tape on the KAL guidance equipment, a "fact" we posited at the time and continue to publically state. Boeing 747 planes do not have a tape to change. We have been told this by many pilots, both in the NDPC and outside it. (See for example, the summary of this "research" reported in the EIR Multi-client report, "The Strategic Secret Behind the Korean Air Lines Massacre".)

2) The flight of the plane was almost certainly not an error. The flight-path of the plane could have been produced, as has been verified by every study (from the CIA's to the UN's), only by the remarkable and unlikely pilot mistake (a possibility greeted by uniform laughter on the part of 747 pilots I have talked to), or by intention on the part of the KAL pilots. The guidance equipment on these planes is multiply redundant, highly reliable, and easy to use; the past navigational record of these planes is exceptional; and there is little room for pilot error. Given a motive for where the plane flew (see below), then one must presume that the flight path was intentional.

3) There is massive evidence for routine espionage deployments of commercial aircraft. As verified by interviews with 747 pilots, commercial airline flights over the Soviet Union are routinely used for espionage (as are, undoubtedly, Aeroflot flights in the West). The fact that this KAL flight had almost twice the normal crew size registered (27 rather than the usual 17) is interesting from this standpoint.

4) The espionage value of such a flight is, contrary to popular impression, very great. Atmospheric aircraft accomplish at least one thing which cannot be done by satellite flights -- the monitoring and testing of air defense radar systems. The air defense radar over eastern Siberia is one of the most closely guarded Soviet secrets; they do not test the radar at full power nor in combat modes (frequency, pulse length, directionality) for the obvious reason that Western electronic countermeasures could be designed to thwart that air defense system. The only way for the West to get this information is to probe the Soviet air defenses with a plane and see what happens. This is a standard procedure on both sides. The KAL flight may have been designed to do this. The fact of the

otherwise/unexplained 40 minute delay in take-off is notable since this delay did accomplish (the Soviets have pointed out) synchronization of the flight with the American air defense monitoring satellite, FERRET-D).

None of these facts, of course, justify the Soviet destruction of a civilian airliner, nor their reaction afterwards. But the question here is not moral justification, but analysis of the intention of the Soviet Union in shooting down the plane. The evidence above points very strongly in the direction of the plane's spying mission, and a careful examination of the shooting down of the plane and of their reaction, indicates that the Soviets believed this at the time, and continue to do so.

First of all, as has been documented by the release of the complete transcripts of the tapes monitored of Soviet military conversations, the Soviets did not know that the plane was a Boeing 747. This fact has been recently corroborated by a very interesting article which appeared in the journal of the Soviet Air Force, Aviation and Cosmonautics, criticizing the pilot and ground controllers involved in the incident for their failure to identify the plane before shooting at it: "The main person [with responsibility in a combat situation] is the pilot, and it is his job to solve the problems that confront him in the air. The situation may be such that the pilot himself must take the final decision, for example, to force the intruder to land at the closest airport." And, in marked contrast to the initial, almost hysterical defensiveness of the Soviet military, there have been recent reassignments and demotions in the Far East Air Defense Command and a public reprimand of the action.

In retrospect, the significance of the KAL incident resembles very closely that of the U-2 incident. At that point, a summit meeting of major importance was about to take place between Eisenhower and Krushchev. It was aborted by the downing of Gary Power's U-2, on an overflight of the Soviet Union which was later shown to have been staged in such a way that a provocation of the Soviet Union was almost inevitable, a provocation planned by a faction in the U.S. intent on sabotaging the summit meeting.

The timing of the KAL flight was too neat, too perfect, and its destruction of discussion between the superpowers of beam weapons, just too complete not to have been planned. There are certainly enough forces committed to the destruction of beam weapons in Western intelligence services to create exactly such an incident, relying on the paranoid profile of the Soviet military to accomplish the rest. It certainly worked.

#### THE QUESTION OF "NATIONAL SOUL"

Much has been made of the importance of "method" in our determination of the Third Rome Hypothesis, to the point that Lyn in his original document on the hypothesis stated that there was no

"evidence" relevant to discussion of the hypothesis. The methodological question has centered on the nature and significance of national character or national soul. It is important to distinguish this from the organizations ground-breaking work on national ideology.

The critical point is that all human beings share three levels of consciousness, and the same forces in every society shape the relative dominance of one over the other, both in the individual and in the society. In every society, the forces of self-consciousness, commitment to progress, and to a human view of human beings are associated with scientific work, with advancement of living standards, and with economic growth. In every society, the oligarchical world-outlook uses the peasant, rural idiocy to destroy that progressive tendency and restore its bestial program for humanity. This is basic to the method of the organization.

Completely opposite is the blood and soil doctrine of a national soul. This doctrine, expounded for the Soviet Union first (to my knowledge) by Arnold Toynbee, and lately by such Soviet "experts" as Brian Crozier, insists on the contrary on the fundamental, almost genetic tendency of the Russian national soul to reject Western humanism and science in favor of Mother Russia.

The question at issue here is not whether such an ideology exists in the Soviet Union -- it obviously does (and not just in the Soviet Union, as is dramatically proved by our own analysis of the "Christian" fundamentalist movement in the U.S. which uses that same blood and soil peasant ideology very effectively in the country most committed to the idea of progress). The question is whether that ideology now controls the policy makers of the Soviet Union. The only in depth analysis of this question appeared in two EIR articles (and the background reports to these articles) by Criton Zoakos (July 26 and September 27, 1983). These two articles merit careful rereading because of the paucity of evidence they offer for the hypothesis of Third Rome control of Moscow.

In the first of these (and the reports and lectures preceding it by several months), the evidence is laid out in two pieces. The first documents quite convincingly the impact of Russian chauvanism on Soviet culture. While the quotations offered from the Soviet equivalent of Readers' Digest may be revolting, they hardly prove control of policy by this faction. And, in fact, the second part of the article in turn documents that the real control of the Soviet Union, since the overthrow of Krushchev, has rested in the hands of the military. This is also convincingly shown, but totally undercuts the attempt made to prove control by a Third Rome faction.

The article then goes on to document (again convincingly) that the ideology of this military faction is not Marxism-Leninism, but rather what the Soviets call "systems analysis." The meaning of this term is obviously different for the Soviet military than the U.S. McNamara school of systems analysis, as the most superficial analysis of the military doctrines of the two countries shows. In fact, the Western version of systems analysis is inextricably wedded

to Malthusianism (see Lyn's article on systems analysis for a profound analysis of this connection). The Soviet doctrine by the same name is clearly not -- as the very military policy itself shows. The policy of the Soviet military as evidenced by their writings and deployments could not have been conceived of or implemented by a Third Rome faction. To the extent that Nick succeeds in proving that Soviet policy is today controlled by the military following Sokolovskii's doctrine, he has methodologically shown that the Soviet Union is not controlled by a Third Rome faction.

The second of these two articles addresses the question from the standpoint of the role of the Russian Orthodox Church in influencing policy in the Soviet Union. As Nick stresses at several points in the article, the critical piece of evidence in the case is the role of the Russian Orthodox Church in shaping and forcing the Soviet response to the Reagan beam weapon speech. As was indicated above, the Soviet response was not a rejection, and from this fact alone one is forced to the conclusion that the ROC cannot have controlled the policy (however much they may have argued for such a rejection).

Internally interesting is the mistakes that Nick makes in attempting to document the ROC's role in the Soviet decision on Reagan's speech. He says:

Patriarch Pimen was the first person of any authority in the U.S.S.R. to denounce a policy which no one on earth knew to exist as an active policy. ... With respect to the matter of the Russian Orthodox Church's dominant position in current policy making, ... the large piece [of evidence], which also is the crucial experimental evidence for our case, is their attitude towards President Reagan's offer for a laser-based anti-missile defense program. It is not accidental that Patriarch Pimen was the first to denounce the President's offer a full eight months before the President publicly announced it.

In fact, Pimen was echoing a policy statement released by the Vatican Pontifical Academy drafted between March and June of 1982. It excoriates space weaponry in much the same tone as does Pimen (it is possible that Pimen was one of those involved in the drafting of the document). But the existence of the Vatican statement makes the whole causal chain ascribed to Pimen's unique knowledge and concern over beam weapons entirely contrived. The achievement of strategic defense has been a fear of the Soviet military for 20 years; it has been a major worry (if not the increasingly dominant fear) of the arms-controllers and their church-related associates for at least the past five years. Pimen was involved in that debate both as a participant and policy-maker, but to use that at the "crucial experimental evidence" requires an extremely self-serving recounting of recent history.

## THE METHOD OF THE ORGANIZATION

The hypothesis of a significant change in Soviet policy over the recent period in the direction of an imperial policy matrix based on the conception of a "Third and Final Rome" is so patently and obviously incorrect that the organization's espousal of it says more about the organization than about the Soviet Union.

At the point that the Third Rome Hypothesis was first posed (in Lyn's Holy Cow memo), the reaction of the intelligence staff and executive was not only to "document" the hypothesis, as quickly as possible rewrite both the history of the world and of the organization to be "coherent" with this hypothesis. This was not a process of reconceptualization, and at no point was there the slightest chance that the hypothesis would actually be tested -- the job of the organization was to prove it (its truth was never in question).

Several aspects of the organization's psychological profile are especially starkly illuminated by this process:

1) The lack of a serious policy deliberation process in the organization. Policy tends to be set on the basis of anecdotal information (especially if that information comes with the imprimatur of being covert or from a covert source) without clear analysis before policy adoption. Because of a fear of criticizing Lyn, Lyn's most tentative hypotheses become automatically verified by information gathered more to justify an approved thesis than to provide actual analytical capabilities.

2) The tendency for policy to be set with an eye to the impact of that policy on important, influential, or powerful forces. The result is opportunism justified by appeals to the political realism, the fact that these forces are "in our political universe," or desire for manipulation of a stupid and immoral population. The fact that this tendency is vastly accentuated by the offer from a powerful source of "influence" (not influence itself, merely the offer of influence) makes Lyn's characterization of this tendency as "prostitution" clinically accurate.

3) A sense of frustration on Lyn's part framed by his increasing concern over his age and the lack of public acknowledgement of his role in world history. The result has been a sense of desperation in our relations with the Reagan administration in which our perception of how they perceive us becomes more and more important in shaping our own policy. The sight of Lyn, in several high-level meetings with NSC staff members, literally begging for access to NSC and White House officials is a tragic example of this.

This profile leads to corresponding vulnerabilities: our susceptibility to any information presented in clandestine form through a covert (or apparently covert) source is a serious

vulnerability. The amount of garbage we have retailed because it came from "down the way" is quite remarkable, and our systematic unwillingness to critically examine this information has left us over and over again open to manipulation.

This is compounded by the reaction of the organization when confronted with the "offer" of influence. The result of offers like this, has been, time and time again, that the offering institution enters "our political universe," and we begin to pander to this institution, to propitiate it, to protect it from epistemological confrontation. Our still-regretted dalliance with Spotlight magazine is perhaps the most striking instance of this "political realism," as a cover for obscene opportunism.

These weaknesses of the organization have led to our present situation: we are being led around by the nose by our perception of what the Reagan Administration wants us to do and say. At the point, nine months ago, that Reagan adopted an approximation of our policy, our NSC/CIA/DIA "connections" acquired a powerful hold over us. We now began to bend our polemics, public statements, intelligence tasks, and terms of reference to suit our newly acquired clients.

The extent to which they took advantage of this pliability is unclear, but whether they ran an operation against us, or merely let us run the operation against ourselves, is not critical. The results are the same.

All this would be disturbing enough if it affected only the internal life of the organization, but it has also had the objective effect of worsening the danger of war. While we should have been campaigning for beam weapons as the essential element of American defense, we have instead proposed increased offensive weaponry along with beam weapons to defeat the Russian menace. When we should have been continuing our unique role as the spokesman and organizer of a sane relationship between the superpowers based on mutual interest, we have become the advocates of a massive in-width military build-up in the U.S. and the most rabid Red-Scare. When we should have been devoting our energies to the construction of a new world economic order of sovereign states, we have been justifying a U.S. invasion into Ibero-America and the creation of an American "strategic reserve."

As I stressed at the conference, the result of misreading the causes of the current crisis has been to exacerbate that crisis in three respects;

- 1) The proposal of a U.S. military policy which uses the most dangerous aspects of deterrence "theory" in an attempt to threaten the Soviet Union. Based on the Third Rome Hypothesis, we have mistakenly concluded that the Soviet Union is bent on a near-term showdown with the U.S. To respond to this insane policy of the Soviets, we go on to propose accelerated deployment of the worst of the offensive weapons (like the Pershings and the MX), in hopes of intimidating the Soviet Union. We have even adopted the most extreme of the MAD strategists ideas of a psychological chicken game to "convince the Soviets we are serious" and of Doomsday weapons (like Lyn's cobalt bombs with fans).

The organization has proposed an intensification of the now obsolete offense-dominated strategy. The result would be a military situation in which the U.S. had decreased security. The world is in an exceedingly dangerous situation; the crisis caused by 15 years of sabotage and treason in the U.S. is coming home; the U.S. must rapidly rebuild its ability to function as a superpower. However, and this is the tragedy, because of the Third Rome Hypothesis, the military policy proposed now by the organization perpetuates the deterrence/MAD strategy that has undermined the country.

2) The distortion of the beam weapon policy from a war-avoidance policy into a weapon for fighting the Soviet Union. Such a beam weapon policy turns beam weapons into a first-strike weapon and results in their destabilizing the current situation. As we have stated over and over again, the development and deployment of beam weapons is in the interest of both superpowers. However, with the advent of the Third Rome Hypothesis, we have denied the right of the Soviet Union to exist (in its present form). We have stated that it is an "outlaw," "Nazi" state.

In this context of the most rabid, anti-Soviet hysteria, beam weapons have become totally subsidiary to our analysis of the imminent Soviet confrontation with the U.S. and are no longer the basis of a war-avoidance strategy. The fact that Lyn hardly mentioned beam weapons in the January television address is indicative of this shift. At the present point, we are proposing beam weapons (or at least, their first generation versions) as one of the main components of a system for fighting the Soviet Union.

It is exactly in the context of a belief that the Soviet Union is a Nazi state bent on world domination that the use of beam weapons as part of a first-strike becomes entirely realistic. While the organization has not proposed a first-strike against the Soviet Union, all the prerequisites are at hand to justify such a policy, except for the technologies to limit damage to the U.S. At the point that those become available, then what is a Soviet military strategist to conclude about this "policy matrix"?

3) An attempt to polarize all international politics into a question of relations between the superpowers. The result is a Kissingerian picture of the world, divided into geopolitical spheres subservient to one or another of the superpowers, in which national sovereignty is nonexistent.

We have posed the questions of world development in distinctly geopolitical terms. Lyn's interview with the Bangkok press, for example, stresses the importance of the Mekong River project because it allows the U.S. to outflank the Soviet influence in Southeast Asia and prevent Vietnam from becoming a Soviet client-state. In the NDPC policy statement on Ibero-America and Operation Juarez, the strategic importance of the debt question is posed in terms of the strength of the West in the coming confrontation with the Soviet Union.